Luna Torres v. Lynch, 578 U.S. ___ (2016) (2025)

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision beforepublication in the preliminary print of the United StatesReports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543,of any typographical or other formal errors, in order thatcorrections may be made before the preliminary print goes topress.SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES_________________No. 14–1096_________________JORGE LUNA TORRES, PETITIONER v. LORETTA E. LYNCH,ATTORNEY GENERALon writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals forthe second circuit[May 19, 2016]Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court.The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA or Act) imposes certainadverse immigration consequences on an alien convicted of an“aggravated felony.” The INA defines that term by listing variouscrimes, most of which are identified as offenses “described in”specified provisions of the federal criminal code. Immediatelyfollowing that list, the Act provides that the referenced offensesare aggravated felonies irrespective of whether they are “inviolation of Federal[,] State[,]” or foreign law. 108 Stat. 4322, 8U.S.C. §1101(a)(43). In this case, we must decide if astate crime counts as an aggravated felony when it corresponds to aspecified federal offense in all ways but one—namely, the statecrime lacks the interstate commerce element used in the federalstatute to establish legislative jurisdiction (i.e.,Congress’s power to enact the law). We hold that the absence ofsuch a jurisdictional element is immaterial: A state crime of thatkind is an aggravated felony.IThe INA makes any alien convicted of an “aggravated felony”after entering the United States deportable. See§1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Such an alien is also ineligible for severalforms of discretionary relief, including cancellation of removal—anorder allowing a deportable alien to remain in the country. See§1229b(a)(3). And because of his felony, the alien faces expeditedremoval proceedings. See §1228(a)(3)(A).The Act defines the term “aggravated felony” by way of a longlist of offenses, now codified at §1101(a)(43). In all, thatprovision’s 21 subparagraphs enumerate some 80 different crimes. Inmore than half of those subparagraphs, Congress specified thecrimes by citing particular federal statutes. According to thatcommon formulation, an offense is an aggravated felony if it is“described in,” say, 18 U.S.C. §2251 (relating to childpornography), §922(g) (relating to unlawful gun possession), or, ofparticular relevance here, §844(i) (relating to arson andexplosives). 8 U.S.C. §§1101(a)(43)(E), (I). Most ofthe remaining subparagraphs refer to crimes by their genericlabels, stating that an offense is an aggravated felony if, forexample, it is “murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor.”§1101(a)(43)(A). Following the entire list of crimes,§1101(a)(43)’s penultimate sentence reads: “The term [aggravatedfelony] applies to an offense described in this paragraph whetherin violation of Federal or State law and applies to such an offensein violation of the law of a foreign country for which the term ofimprisonment was completed within the previous 15 years.” So,putting aside the 15-year curlicue, the penultimate sentenceprovides that an offense listed in §1101(a)(43) is an aggravatedfelony whether in violation of federal, state, or foreign law.Petitioner Jorge Luna Torres, who goes by the name George Luna,immigrated to the United States as a child and has lived here eversince as a lawful permanent resident. In 1999, he pleaded guilty toattempted arson in the third degree, in violation of New York law;he was sentenced to one day in prison and five years of probation.Seven years later, immigration officials discovered his convictionand initiated proceedings to remove him from the country. Duringthose proceedings, Luna applied for cancellation of removal. Butthe Immigration Judge found him ineligible for that discretionaryrelief because his arson conviction qualified as an aggravatedfelony. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 21a–22a.The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) affirmed, based on acomparison of the federal and New York arson statutes. Seeid., at 15a–17a. The INA, as just noted, provides that “anoffense described in” 18 U.S.C. §844(i), the federalarson and explosives statute, is an aggravated felony. Section844(i), in turn, makes it a crime to “maliciously damage[] ordestroy[], or attempt[] to damage or destroy, by meansof fire or an explosive, any building [or] vehicle ...used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affectinginterstate or foreign commerce.” For its part, the New York lawthat Luna was convicted under prohibits “intentionally damag[ing],”or attempting to damage, “a building or motor vehicle by starting afire or causing an explosion.” N.Y. Penal Law Ann. §§110,150.10 (West 2010). The state law, the Board explained, thusmatches the federal statute element-for-element with one exception:The New York law does not require a connection to interstatecommerce. According to the Board, that single difference did notmatter because the federal statute’s commerce element is“jurisdictional”—that is, its function is to establish Congress’spower to legislate. See App. to Pet for Cert. 16a–17a. Given thatthe two laws’ substantive (i.e., non-jurisdictional)elements map onto each other, the Board held, the New York arsonoffense is “described in” 18 U.S.C. §844(i).The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied Luna’spetition for review of the Board’s ruling. See 764 F.3d 152(2014). The court’s decision added to a Circuit split over whethera state offense is an aggravated felony when it has all theelements of a listed federal crime except one requiring aconnection to interstate commerce.[1] We grantedcertiorari. 576 U.S. ___ (2015).IIThe issue in this case arises because of the distinctive roleinterstate commerce elements play in federal criminal law. In ourfederal system, “Congress cannot punish felonies generally,”Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 428 (1821); it mayenact only those criminal laws that are connected to one of itsconstitutionally enumerated powers, such as the authority toregulate interstate commerce. As a result, most federal offensesinclude, in addition to substantive elements, a jurisdictional one,like the interstate commerce requirement of §844(i). Thesubstantive elements “primarily define[] the behavior thatthe statute calls a ‘violation’ of federal law,” Scheidlerv. National Organization for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9,18 (2006) —or, as the Model Penal Code puts the point, they relateto “the harm or evil” the law seeks to prevent, §1.13(10). Thejurisdictional element, by contrast, ties the substantive offense(here, arson) to one of Congress’s constitutional powers (here, itsauthority over interstate commerce), thus spelling out the warrantfor Congress to legislate. See id., at 17–18 (explainingthat Congress intends “such statu-tory terms as ‘affect commerce’or ‘in commerce’ ... as terms of art connecting thecongressional exercise of legislative authority with theconstitutional provision (here, the Commerce Clause) that grantsCongress that authority”).For obvious reasons, state criminal laws do not include thejurisdictional elements common in federal statutes.[2] State legislatures, exercising their plenary policepowers, are not limited to Congress’s enumerated powers; and soStates have no reason to tie their substantive offenses to thosegrants of authority. See, e.g., United States v.Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) . In particular, statecrimes do not contain interstate commerce elements because a Statedoes not need such a jurisdictional hook. Accordingly, even stateoffenses whose substantive elements match up exactly with a federallaw’s will part ways with respect to interstate commerce. Thatslight discrepancy creates the issue here: If a state offense lacksan interstate commerce element but otherwise mirrors one of thefederal statutes listed in §1101(a)(43), does the state crime countas an aggravated felony? Or, alternatively, does the jurisdictionaldifference reflected in the state and federal laws preclude thatresult, no matter the laws’ substantive correspondence?Both parties begin with the statutory text most directly atissue, disputing when a state offense (here, arson) is “describedin” an enumerated federal statute (here, 18 U.S.C.§844(i)). Luna, armed principally with Black’s Law Dictionary,argues that “described in” means “expressed” or “set forth”in—which, he says, requires the state offense to include each oneof the federal law’s elements. Brief for Petitioner 15–16.[3] The Government, brandishing dictionaries of its own,contends that the statutory phrase has a looser meaning—that“describing entails ... not precise replication,” but“convey[ance of] an idea or impression” or of a thing’s“central features.” Brief for Respondent 17.[4]On that view, “described in,” as opposed to the more precise“defined in” sometimes found in statutes, denotes that the stateoffense need only incorporate the federal law’s core, substantiveelements.But neither of those claims about the bare term “described in”can resolve this case. Like many words, “describe” takes ondifferent meanings in different contexts. Consider two ways inwhich this Court has used the word. In one case, “describe”conveyed exactness: A contractual provision, we wrote, “describesthe subject [matter] with great particularity[,] ...giv[ing] the precise number of pounds [of tobacco], the tax forwhich each pound was liable, and the aggregate of the tax.”Ryan v. United States, 19 Wall. 514, 517 (1874). Inanother case, not: “The disclosure provision is meant,” we stated,“to describe the law to consumers in a manner that is concise andcomprehensible to the layman—which necessarily means that it willbe imprecise.” CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565U.S. 95, 102 (2012) . So staring at, or even looking up, thewords “described in” cannot answer whether a state offense mustreplicate every last element of a listed federal statute, includingits jurisdictional one, to qualify as an aggravated felony. Inconsidering that issue, we must, as usual, “interpret the relevantwords not in a vacuum, but with reference to the statutorycontext.” Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S.___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 9).[5]Here, two contextual considerations decide the matter. The firstis §1101(a)(43)’s penultimate sentence, which shows that Congressmeant the term “aggravated felony” to capture serious crimesregardless of whether they are prohibited by federal, state, orforeign law. The second is a well-established background principledistinguishing between substantive and jurisdictional elements infederal criminal statutes. We address each factor in turn.ASection 1101(a)(43)’s penultimate sentence, as noted above,provides: “The term [aggravated felony] applies to an offensedescribed in this paragraph whether in violation of Federal orState law and applies to such an offense in violation of the law ofa foreign country for which the term of imprisonment was completedwithin the previous 15 years.” See supra, at 2. Thatsentence (except for the time limit on foreign convictions)declares the source of criminal law irrelevant: The listed offensescount as aggravated felonies regardless of whether they are madeillegal by the Federal Government, a State, or a foreign country.That is true of the crimes identified by reference to federalstatutes (as here, an offense described in 18 U.S.C.§844(i)), as well as those employing generic labels (for example,murder). As even Luna recognizes, state and foreign analogues ofthe enumerated federal crimes qual-ify as aggravated felonies. SeeBrief for Petitioner 21 (contesting only what properly counts assuch an analogue). The whole point of §1101(a)(43)’s penultimatesentence is to make clear that a listed offense should lead toswift removal, no matter whether it violates federal, state, orforeign law.Luna’s jot-for-jot view of “described in” would substantiallyundercut that function by excluding from the Act’s coverage allstate and foreign versions of any enumerated federal offense that(like §844(i)) contains an interstate commerce element. Such anelement appears in about half of §1101(a)(43)’s listedstatutes—defining, altogether, 27 serious crimes.[6] Yet under Luna’s reading, only those federal crimes,and not their state and foreign counterparts, would provide a basisfor an alien’s removal—because, as explained earlier, only Congressmust ever show a link to interstate commerce. See supra, at4–5. No state or foreign legislature needs to incorporate acommerce element to establish its jurisdiction, and so none everdoes. Accordingly, state and foreign crimes will never preciselyreplicate a federal statute containing a commerce element. And thatmeans, contrary to §1101(a)(43)’s penultimate sentence, that theterm “aggravated felony” would not apply to many of theAct’s listed offenses irrespective of whether they are “inviolation of Federal[,] State[, or foreign] law”; instead, thatterm would apply exclusively to the federal variants.[7]Indeed, Luna’s view would limit the penultimate sentence’seffect in a peculiarly perverse fashion—excluding state and foreignconvictions for many of the gravest crimes listed in §1101(a)(43),while reaching those convictions for less harmful offenses.Consider some of the state and foreign crimes that would not countas aggravated felonies on Luna’s reading because the correspondingfederal law has a commerce element: most child pornographyoffenses, including selling a child for the purpose ofmanufacturing such material, see §1101(a)(43)(I); demanding orreceiving a ransom for kidnapping, see §1101(a)(43)(H); andpossessing a firearm after a felony conviction, see§1101(a)(43)(E)(ii). Conversely, the term “aggravated felony” inLuna’s world would include state and foreign convictions for suchcomparatively minor offenses as operating an unlawful gamblingbusiness, see §1101(a)(43)(J), and possessing a firearm notidentified by a serial number, see §1101(a)(43)(E)(iii), becauseCongress chose, for whatever reason, not to use a commerce elementwhen barring that conduct. And similarly, the term would cover anystate or foreign conviction for such nonviolent activity asreceiving stolen property, see §1101(a)(43)(G), or forgingdocuments, see §1101(a)(43)(R), because the INA happens to usegeneric labels to describe those crimes. This Court has previouslyrefused to construe §1101(a)(43) so as to produce such“haphazard”—indeed, upside-down—coverage. Nijhawan v.Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 40 (2009) . We see no reason tofollow a different path here: Congress would not have placed analien convicted by a State of running an illegal casino at greaterrisk of removal than one found guilty under the same State’s law ofselling a child.[8]In an attempt to make some sense of his reading, Luna positsthat Congress might have believed that crimes having an interstateconnection are generally more serious than those lacking one—forexample, that interstate child pornography is “worse” than theintrastate variety. Brief for Petitioner 35. But to begin with,that theory cannot explain the set of crazy-quilt results justdescribed: Not even Luna maintains that Congress thought local actsof selling a child, receiving explosives, or demanding a ransom arecategorically less serious than, say, operating an unlawful casinoor receiving stolen property (whether or not in interstatecommerce). And it is scarcely more plausible to view an interstatecommerce element in any given offense as separating serious fromnon-serious conduct: Why, for example, would Congress see an alienwho carried out a kidnapping for ransom wholly within a State asmaterially less dangerous than one who crossed state lines incommitting that crime? The essential harm of the crime is the sameirrespective of state borders. Luna’s argument thus misconceivesthe function of interstate commerce elements: Rather thandistinguishing greater from lesser evils, they serve (as earlierexplained) to connect a given substantive offense to one ofCongress’s enumerated powers. See supra, at 4–5. And stillmore fundamentally, Luna’s account runs counter to the penultimatesentence’s central message: that the national, local, or foreigncharacter of a crime has no bearing on whether it is grave enoughto warrant an alien’s automatic removal.[9]Luna (and the dissent, see post, at 6) must thereforefall back on a different defense: that his approach would excludefrom the universe of aggravated felonies fewer serious state andforeign offenses than one might think. To make that argument, Lunarelies primarily on a part of the Act specifying that the term“aggravated felony” shall include “a crime of violence (as definedin [ 18 U.S.C. §16]) for which the term of imprisonment[is] at least one year.” §1101(a)(43)(F); see 18 U.S.C.§16 (defining “crime of violence” as involving the use of “physicalforce” against the person or property of another). According toLuna, many state and foreign offenses failing to match the Act’slisted federal statutes (for want of an interstate commerceelement) would count as crimes of violence and, by that alternativeroute, trigger automatic removal. A different statutory phrase, orso Luna says, would thus plug the holes opened by his constructionof the “described in” provisions.Luna’s argument does not reassure us. We agree that statecounterparts of some enumerated federal offenses would qualify asaggravated felonies through the “crime of violence” provision. Butnot nearly all such offenses, and not even the worst ones. Consideragain some of the listed offenses described earlier. Seesupra, at 10. The “crime of violence” provision would notpick up demanding a ransom for kidnapping. See 18U.S.C. §875(a) (defining the crime without anyreference to physical force). It would not cover most of the listedchild pornography offenses, involving the distribution, receipt,and possession of such materials. It would not reachfelon-in-possession laws and other firearms offenses. And indeed,it would not reach arson in the many States defining that crime toinclude the destruction of one’s own property. See Jordisonv. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1134, 1135 (CA9 2007) (holdingthat a violation of California’s arson statute does not count as acrime of violence for that reason); Tr. of Oral Arg. 28–29(Solicitor General agreeing with that interpretation).[10] So under Luna’s reading, state and foreigncounterparts to a broad swath of listed statutes would remainoutside §1101(a)(43)’s coverage merely because they lack anexplicit interstate commerce connection. And for all the reasonsdiscussed above, that result would significantly restrict thepenultimate sentence’s force and effect, and in an utterly randommanner.[11]BJust as important, a settled practice of distinguishing betweensubstantive and jurisdictional elements of federal criminal lawssupports reading §1101(a)(43) to include state analogues lacking aninterstate commerce requirement. As already explained, thesubstantive elements of a federal statute describe the evilCongress seeks to prevent; the jurisdictional element connects thelaw to one of Congress’s enumerated powers, thus establishinglegislative authority. See supra, at 4–5; ALI, Model PenalCode §1.13(10) (1962). Both kinds of elements must be proved to ajury beyond a reasonable doubt; and because that is so, both mayplay a real role in a criminal case. But still, they are notcreated equal for every purpose. To the contrary, courts have oftenrecognized—including when comparing federal and state offenses—thatCongress uses substantive and jurisdictional elements for differentreasons and does not expect them to receive identicaltreatment.Consider the law respecting mens rea. In general, courtsinterpret criminal statutes to require that a defendant possess amens rea, or guilty mind, as to every element of an offense.See Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. ___, ___(2015) (slip op., at 10). That is so even when the “statute by itsterms does not contain” any demand of that kind. UnitedStates v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 70(1994) . In such cases, courts read the statute against a“background rule” that the defendant must know each fact making hisconduct illegal. Staples v. United States, 511U.S. 600, 619 (1994) . Or otherwise said, they infer, absentan express indication to the contrary, that Congress intended sucha mental-state requirement.Except when it comes to jurisdictional elements. There, thisCourt has stated, “the existence of the fact that confers federaljurisdiction need not be one in the mind of the actor at the timehe perpetrates the act made criminal by the federal statute.”United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 677, n. 9(1975) ; see United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S.63, 68 (1984) (“Jurisdictional language need not contain the sameculpability requirement as other elements of the offense”); ModelPenal Code §2.02. So when Congress has said nothing about themental state pertaining to a jurisdictional element, the defaultrule flips: Courts assume that Congress wanted such an element tostand outside the otherwise applicable mens rea requirement.In line with that practice, courts have routinely held that acriminal defendant need not know of a federal crime’s interstatecommerce connection to be found guilty. See, e.g., UnitedStates v. Jinian, 725 F.3d 954, 964–966 (CA92013); United States v. Lindemann, 85 F.3d1232, 1241 (CA7 1996); United States v. Blackmon, 839F.2d 900, 907 (CA2 1988). Those courts have recognized, as wedo here, that Congress viewed the commerce element as distinctfrom, and subject to a different rule than, the elements describingthe substantive offense.Still more strikingly, courts have distinguished between the twokinds of elements in contexts, similar to this one, in which thejudicial task is to compare federal and state offenses. TheAssimilative Crimes Act (ACA), 18 U.S.C. §13(a),subjects federal enclaves, like military bases, to state criminallaws except when they punish the same conduct as a federal statute.The ACA thus requires courts to decide when a federal and a statelaw are sufficiently alike that only the federal one will apply.And we have held that, in making that assessment, courts shouldignore jurisdictional elements: When the “differences amongelements” of the state and federal crimes “reflect jurisdictional,or other technical, considerations” alone, then the state law willhave no effect in the area. Lewis v. United States,523 U.S. 155, 165 (1998) ; see also id., at 182(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (agreeing that courts should “look beyond... jurisdictional elements,” and focus only onsubstantive ones, in determining whether “the elements of the twocrimes are the same”). In such a case, we reasoned—just as we donow—that Congress meant for the federal jurisdictional element tobe set aside.And lower courts have uniformly adopted the same approach whencomparing federal and state crimes in order to apply the federalthree-strikes statute. That law imposes mandatory life imprisonmenton a person convicted on three separate occasions of a “seriousviolent felony.” 18 U.S.C. §3559(c)(1). Sounding verymuch like the INA, the three-strikes statute defines such a felonyto include “a Federal or State offense, by whatever designation andwherever committed, consisting of” specified crimes (e.g.,murder, manslaughter, robbery) “as described in” listed federalcriminal statutes. §3559(c)(2)(F). In deciding whether a statecrime of conviction thus corresponds to an enumerated federalstatute, every court to have faced the issue has ignored thestatute’s jurisdictional element. See, e.g., United Statesv. Rosario-Delgado, 198 F.3d 1354, 1357 (CA11 1999)(per curiam); United States v. Wicks, 132F.3d 383, 386–387 (CA7 1997). Judge Wood, writing for theSeventh Circuit, highlighted the phrase “a Federal or Stateoffense, by whatever designation and wherever committed”—thethree-strikes law’s version of §1101(a)(43)’s penultimate sentence.“It is hard to see why Congress would have used this language,” shereasoned, “if it had meant that every detail of the federaloffense, including its jurisdictional element[], had to bereplicated in the state offense.” Id., at 386–387. Just so,too, in the INA—whose “aggravated felony” provisions operateagainst, and rely on, an established legal backdrop distinguishingbetween jurisdictional and substantive elements.[12]Luna objects to drawing that line on the ground that it is toohard to tell the difference between the two. See Brief forPetitioner 26–28 (discussing, in particular, statutes criminalizingthe destruction of federal property and sending threats via thePostal Service). But that contention collides with the judicialexperience just described. Courts regularly separate substantivefrom jurisdictional elements in applying federal criminal statutes’mens rea requirements; so too in implementing other lawsthat require a comparison of federal and state offenses. And fromall we can see, courts perform that task with no real trouble: Lunahas not pointed to any divisions between or within Circuits arisingfrom the practice. We do not deny that some tough questions maylurk on the margins—where an element that makes evident Congress’sregulatory power also might play a role in defining the behaviorCongress thought harmful. But a standard interstate commerceelement, of the kind appearing in a great many federal laws, isalmost always a simple jurisdictional hook—and courts may as easilyacknowledge that fact in enforcing the INA as they have done inother contexts.CLuna makes a final argument opposing our reading of§1101(a)(43): If Congress had meant for “ordinary state-law” crimeslike arson to count as aggravated felonies, it would have draftedthe provision to make that self-evident. Brief for Petitioner 20.Congress, Luna submits, would have used the generic term for thosecrimes—e.g., “arson”—rather than demanding that the statelaw of conviction correspond to a listed federal statute. Seeid., at 20–23. Or else, Luna (and the dissent) suggests, seeid., at 24; post, at 13, Congress would haveexpressly distinguished between substantive and jurisdictionalelements, as it did in an unrelated law mandating the pretrialdetention of any person convicted of a federal offense “describedin [a certain federal statute], or of a State or local offense thatwould have been an offense described in [that statute] if acircumstance giving rise to Federal jurisdiction had existed,” 18U.S.C. §3142(e)(2)(A).But as an initial matter, Congress may have had good reason tothink that a statutory reference would capture more accurately thana generic label the range of state convictions warranting automaticdeportation. The clause of §1101(a)(43) applying to Luna’s casewell illustrates the point. By referring to 18 U.S.C.§844(i), that provision incorporates not only the garden-varietyarson offenses that a generic “arson” label would cover, butvarious explosives offenses too. See Brief for Petitioner 23,n.7 (conceding that had Congress used the term “arson,” itwould have had to separately identify the explosives crimesencompassed in §844(i)). And the elements of generic arson arethemselves so uncertain as to pose problems for a court having todecide whether they are present in a given state law. See Poulos,The Metamorphosis of the Law of Arson, 51 Mo. L. Rev. 295, 364,387–435 (1986) (describing multiple conflicts over what conduct theterm “arson” includes). Nor is the clause at issue here unusual inthose respects: Section 1101(a)(43) includes many other statutoryreferences that do not convert easily to generic labels. See,e.g., §1101(a)(43)(E)(ii) (listing federal statutes definingvarious firearms offenses). To be sure, Congress used such labelsto describe some crimes qualifying as aggravated felonies—forexample, “murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor.”§1101(a)(43)(A). But what is good for some crimes is not forothers. The use of a federal statutory reference shows only thatCongress thought it the best way to identify certain substantivecrimes—not that Congress wanted (in conflict with the penultimatesentence) to exclude state and foreign versions of those offensesfor lack of a jurisdictional element.Still more, Congress’s omission of statutory languagespecifically directing courts to ignore those elements cannot tipthe scales in Luna’s favor. We have little doubt that “Congresscould have drafted [§1101(a)(43)] with more precision than it did.”Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v.United States ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409, 422 (2005). But the same could be said of many (even most) statutes; as tothat feature, §1101(a)(43) can join a well-populated club. And wehave long been mindful of that fact when interpreting laws. Ratherthan expecting (let alone demanding) perfection in drafting, wehave routinely construed statutes to have a particular meaning evenas we acknowledged that Congress could have expressed itself moreclearly. See, e.g., ibid.; Florida Dept. of Revenuev. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 41 (2008); Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563–571, 575 (1977). The question, then, is not: Could Congress haveindicated (or even did Congress elsewhere indicate) in morecrystalline fashion that comparisons of federal and state offensesshould disregard elements that merely establish legislativejurisdiction? The question is instead, and more simply: Is that theright and fair reading of the statute before us? And the answer tothat question, given the import of §1101(a)(43)’s penultimatesentence and the well-settled background rule distinguishingbetween jurisdictional and substantive elements, is yes.IIIThat reading of §1101(a)(43) resolves this case. Luna hasacknowledged that the New York arson law differs from the listedfederal statute, 18 U.S.C. §844(i), in only onerespect: It lacks an interstate commerce element. See Pet. forCert. 3. And Luna nowhere contests that §844(i)’s commerceelement—featuring the terms “in interstate or foreign commerce” and“affecting interstate or foreign commerce”—is of the standard,jurisdictional kind. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 12, 19; Scheidler,547 U.S., at 17–18 (referring to the phrases “affectcommerce” and “in commerce” as conventional “jurisdictionallanguage”). For all the reasons we have given, such an element isproperly ignored when determining if a state offense counts as anaggravated felony under §1101(a)(43). We accordingly affirm thejudgment of the Second Circuit.It is so ordered.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES_________________No. 14–1096_________________JORGE LUNA TORRES, PETITIONER v.LORETTA E. LYNCH, ATTORNEY GENERALon writ of certiorari to the united statescourt of appeals for the second circuit[May 19, 2016]Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Thomasand Justice Breyer join, dissenting.The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) metesout severe immigration consequences to a noncitizen convicted ofany of a number of “aggravated felon[ies].” 8 U.S.C.§1101(a)(43). An offense “described in” 18 U.S.C.§844(i)—a federal arson statute—qualifies as such a crime.In this case, petitioner, who goes by GeorgeLuna, was convicted of third-degree arson under N. Y. Penal LawAnn. §150.10 (West 2010), which punishes anyone who (1)“intentionally” (2) “damages,” by (3) “starting a fire or causingan explosion,” (4) “a building or motor vehicle.” By contrast, thefederal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. §844(i), applies whensomeone (1) “maliciously” (2) “damages or destroys,” (3) “by meansof fire or an explosive,” (4) “any building, vehicle, or other realor personal property” (5) “used in interstate or foreign commerce.”There is one more element in the federal offense than in the stateoffense—(5), the interstate or foreign commerce element. Luna thuswas not convicted of an offense “described in” the federal statute.Case closed.Not for the majority. It dubs the fifth element“jurisdictional,” then relies on contextual clues to read it out ofthe statute altogether. As a result of the majority’s sleuthing,Luna—a long-time legal permanent resident—is foreclosed from evenappealing to the sound discretion of the Attorney General to obtainrelief from removal. Because precedent and the text and structureof the INA require the opposite result, I respectfully dissent.IANoncitizens convicted of crimes face variousconsequences under the INA. Among the harshest of thoseconsequences fall on noncitizens convicted of 1 of theapproximately 80 “aggravated felonies.” A crime that falls into oneof the listed provisions can be an aggravated felony “whether inviolation of Federal or State law” or “in violation of the law of aforeign country.” See 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43).An aggravated felony conviction has two primaryrepercussions for noncitizens: It renders them deportable,§1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and it makes them categorically ineligible forseveral forms of immigration relief ordinarily left to thediscretion of the Attorney General. See, e.g.,§§1229b(a)–(b) (cancellation of removal).The dozens of aggravated felonies in the INA arespecified in two main ways. First, some are specified by referenceto a generic crime. It is an aggravated felony, for instance, tocommit “murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor.” §1101(a)(43)(A).Some of those crimes use a federal definition as one of theelements. For example: “Illicit trafficking in a controlledsubstance (as defined in [ 21 U.S.C. §802]).” 8U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)(B) (emphasis added). (“Illicittrafficking” is a generic crime; the element of “controlledsubstance” takes the meaning in 21 U.S.C. §802, the“Definitions” provision of the Controlled Substances Act.)Second, it lists crimes that are wholly“described in” the federal criminal code. See, e.g.,§1101(a)(43)(H) (“an offense described in section 875, 876, 877, or1202 of title 18 (relating to the demand for or receipt ofransom)”); §1101(a)(43)(I) (“an offense described in section 2251,2251A, or 2252 of title 18 (relating to child pornography)”). TheGovernment contends that Luna committed a crime in this secondcategory: an “offense described in” 18 U.S.C.§844(i), which criminalizes arson. 8 U.S.C.§1101(a)(43)(E)(i).BIn 2006, Luna was found removable from theUnited States. He attempted to apply for cancellation of removal, aform of relief available to long-time legal permanent residents atthe discretion of the Attorney General. §1229b(a). Nothing inLuna’s history would otherwise preclude cancellation. He was thesole source of financial support for his U. S. citizen fiancée,enrolled in college and studying engineering, a homeowner, and alaw-abiding legal permanent resident since he was brought to theUnited States as a child over 30 years ago, aside from the onethird-degree arson conviction at issue in this case, for which heserved a day in jail.But the Immigration Judge found—and the Board ofImmigration Appeals and the Second Circuit confirmed—that Luna wasineligible for cancellation of removal. Luna’s New York State arsonconviction, the judge held, qualified as an aggravated felony underthe provision for “an offense described in” §844(i), a federalarson statute. See §1101(a)(43)(E)(i). Aggravated felons areineligible for can-cellation of removal. See §1229b(a)(3). Luna’scancellation-of-removal application was thus summarily denied.IIBut the offense of which Luna was convicted isnot “described in” §844(i). This Court’s ordinary method ofinterpreting the aggravated felony statute, the plain text of thatprovision, and the structure of the INA all confirm as much.AThis is not the first time the Court has beentasked with determining whether a state offense constitutes an“aggravated felony” under the INA. Until today, the Court hasalways required the state offense to match every element ofthe listed “aggravated felony.” Kawashima v. Holder,565 U.S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 4); see alsoMoncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. ___, ___ (2013)(slip op., at 4–5); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560U.S. 563, 580 (2010) ; Nijhawan v. Holder, 557U.S. 29, 33 (2009) ; Gonzales v.Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 185 (2007) ;Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 –53 (2006);Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 8 (2004) .Our ordinary methodology thus confirms that thefederal arson statute does not describe the New York arson statuteunder which Luna was convicted. As I have outlined above, seesupra, at 1, the federal statute is more limited: It appliesonly to fires that involve “interstate or foreign commerce.” Thestate statute contains no such limitation. Thus, under the approachwe have used in every case to date, the omission of the interstatecommerce element means that Luna’s state arson conviction was notan aggravated felony under the INA.BThe plain language of the statute supportsthis straightforward approach. The word “describe” means to“express,” “portray,” or “represent.” See Black’s Law Dictionary445 (6th ed. 1990); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary610 (1986). A description may be “detailed” or it may be general,setting forth only the “recognizable features, or characteristicmarks,” of the thing described while leaving the rest to theimagination. 4 Oxford English Dictionary 512 (2d ed. 1989). Forexample, a Craigslist ad describing an apartment with “in-unitlaundry, a dishwasher, rooftop access, central A/C, and a walk-incloset” may leave much to the imagination. After all, thedescription does not mention the apartment’s square footage,windows, or floor number. But though the ad omits features, wewould still call it a “description” because it accurately conveysthe “recognizable features” of the apartment.However, even the most general descriptioncannot refer to features that the thing being described does nothave. The ad is only an accurate description if the apartment“described in” it has at least the five features listed. Ifthe apartment only has four of the five listed features—there is norooftop access, say, or the walk-in closet is not so much walk-inas shimmy-in—then the Craigslist ad no longer “describes” theapartment. Rather, it misdescribes it.So, too, with the statutes in this case. Thefederal description can be general as long as it is stillaccurate—that is, as long as the state law has at least all of theelements in the federal law. But there is no meaning of “describe”that allows the Court to say §844(i) “describes” the New Yorkoffense when the New York offense only has four of the fiveelements listed in §844(i). Section 844(i) misdescribes the NewYork offense just as surely as the too-good-to-be-true Craigslistad misdescribes the real-life apartment.CThe structure of the INA confirms thatconclusion and makes clear that we need not contort the ordinary,accepted meaning of the phrase “described in.” The INA has manyoverlapping provisions that assign carefully calibratedconsequences to various types of criminal convictions. The Courtthus need not interpret any provision—and certainly none of theaggravated felony provisions, among the harshest in the INA—asbroadly as possible because the INA as a whole ensures that seriouscriminal conduct is adequately captured.That overlapping structure is apparentthroughout the INA. First, the aggravated felony list itself hasmultiple fail-safe provisions. Most serious offenses, for instance,will qualify as “crime[s] of violence ... for which theterm of imprisonment [is] at least one year,” 8 U.S.C.§1101(a)(43)(F), even if they are not covered by a more specificprovision in the aggravated felony list. Had his crime been chargedas a more serious arson and had he been punished by one year ofimprisonment instead of one day, Luna might have qualified as anaggravated felon under that provision. See Santana v.Holder, 714 F.3d 140, 145 (CA2 2013) (second-degreearson in New York is a “crime of violence”).[1]Second, other sections of the INA provideintertwining coverage for serious crimes. Some examples ofprovisions that encompass many offenses include those for thecommission of a “crime involving moral turpitude,” a firearmsoffense, or a controlled substance offense, all of which willrender a noncitizen removable, even if he or she has not committedan aggravated felony. See §§1227(a)(2)(A)(i), (B)(i), (C);§§1182(a)(2)(A)(i)–(ii). Cf. Judulang v. Holder, 565U.S. 42, 48 (2011) (commenting on the breadth of the “crimeinvolving moral turpitude” provision).[2]And finally, in Luna’s case or anyone else’s,the Attorney General can exercise her discretion to deny relief toa serious criminal whether or not that criminal has been convictedof an aggravated felony. See Carachuri-Rosendo, 560U.S., at 581 (doubting that a narrow reading of §1101(a)(43)will have “any practical effect on policing our Nation’sborders”).To be sure, on Luna’s reading, some seriousconduct may not be captured by the INA. But not nearly so much asthe majority suggests. By contrast, once the aggra-vated felonystatute applies to a noncitizen, no provision in the INA—andvirtually no act by the Attorney General—can prevent him or herfrom being removed.Looking for consistency in the aggravated felonyprovisions of the INA is often a fool’s errand. SeeKawashima, 565 U.S., at ___, n.2 (slip op., at9, n.2) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting the absurdity ofmaking a tax misdemeanor, but not driving while drunk and causingserious bodily injury, an aggravated felony). But the structure ofthe INA gives the Court no reason to read the aggravated felonyprovisions as broadly as possible.[3] That is why this Court has repeatedly cautioned againstinterpreting the aggravated felony section to sweep in offensesthat—like many state arson convictions—may be neither aggravatednor felonies. See Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S., at 574;Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyersetal. as Amici Curiae 28–29 (collecting statemisdemeanor arson statutes).IIIThe majority denies Luna the opportunity topresent his case to the Attorney General based on two “contextualconsiderations,” ante, at 7, and an intuition about how thestatute ought to work. None are sufficiently persuasive to overcomethe most natural reading of the aggravated felony statute.AThe majority first perceives a conflictbetween Luna’s reading of the INA and what it calls the“penultimate sentence” of the aggravated felony statute. The“penultimate sentence” provides that an offense can be anaggravated felony “whether in violation of Federal or State law” or“in violation of the law of a foreign country.” 8U.S.C. §1101(a)(43). The majority claims that Luna’sreading of the INA would vitiate the quoted proviso. Ante,at 8–10.It is true that, on Luna’s reading, someof the aggra-vated felonies listed in the INA (including “anoffense de-scribed in” §844(i)) will have no state or foreignanalog. But the proviso still applies to generic offenses, whichconstitute nearly half of the entries in the aggravated felonylist. See, e.g., §§1101(a)(43)(A), (G), (M)(i). And thatalready-large portion jumps to close to three-quarters of theoffenses after counting those many listed federal statutes with nojurisdictional element. See, e.g., §§1101(a)(43)(C),(E)(ii), (J). In fact, it applies to the vast majority of offensesadjudicated under the INA given that most serious crimes are also“crimes of violence.” See §1101(a)(43)(F).[4]And the majority must admit that itsinterpretation will also leave entries in the aggravated-felonysection with no state or foreign analogs. For instance, it seemsunlikely that the proviso contemplates state analogs for theaggravated felony provisions regarding treason, levying war againstthe United States, or disclosing national defense information. See§§1101(a)(43)(L)(i), (P).In other words, under Luna’s reading, the“penultimate sentence” applies to most, but not all, of the entriesof the aggravated felony statute; under the majority’s reading, the“penultimate sentence” also applies to most, but not all, of theentries of the aggravated felony statute. The majority’s first“contextual consideration” thus supplies no reason to prefer onereading over the other.BJust as important, the majority suggests, is a“settled practice of distinguishing between substantive... elements”—those that define “the evil Congressseeks to prevent”—and “jurisdictional element[s],” which merely“establis[h] legislative authority.” Ante, at 15. Themajority admits that the Court does not distinguish betweensubstantive and jurisdictional elements for many purposes, such asproof beyond a reasonable doubt and the rightto a jury trial.Ibid.; see Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.584, 606 (2002) . But it nonetheless insists on a standarddistinction so entrenched that Congress must have intended it toapply even absent any particular indication in the INA.None of the three examples that the majorityproffers is evidence of such a strong norm. First, the majorityinvokes our rules for interpreting criminal statutes. Ante,at 15–16. Whereas our general assumption is that a de-fendant mustknow each fact making his conduct illegal, courts generally holdthat a criminal defendant need not know the facts that satisfy thejurisdictional element of a statute.But jurisdictional elements are not the onlyelements a defendant need not know. Under the “default rule,”ante, at 18, n.12, for interpreting so-called “publicwelfare” offenses, courts have held that a defendant need not knowthat the substance he possesses is a narcotic, that the device hepossesses is unregistered, or that he reentered the United Statesafter previously being deported. See Staples v. UnitedStates, 511 U.S. 600 –609, 611 (1994) (citing UnitedStates v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) , andUnited States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971) );United States v. Burwell, 690 F.3d 500, 508–509(CADC 2012); United States v. Giambro, 544 F.3d26, 29 (CA1 2008); United States v. Martinez-Morel,118 F.3d 710, 715–717 (CA10 1997). But surely the majoritywould not suggest that if we agree with those holdings regardingmens rea, we must then ignore the “controlled substance”element of the drug trafficking aggravated felony, the“unregistered” element of the unregistered firearms aggravatedfelony, or the “following deportation” element of the illegalreentry aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C.§§1101(a)(43)(B), (E)(iii), (M)(i), (O). So there is likewise noreason to believe that the “default rule” for assigning mensrea to jurisdictional elements is embedded in the INA.The majority next points to two of the manystatutes that, like the INA, require comparing the elements offederal and state offenses. But in each case, it is the statute’slanguage and context, not some “settled practice,” ante, at15, that command the omission of the jurisdic-tional element.The majority’s first example, ante, at16–17, is the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.§13(a), a gap-filling statute that incorporates state criminal lawinto federal enclaves if the “act or omission” is not “madepunishable by any enactment of Congress” but “would be punishableif committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the State.” TheCourt held that, in identifying such a gap, courts should ignore“jurisdictional, or other technical,” differences between a stateand federal statute. Lewis v. United States, 523U.S. 155, 165 (1998) . But the way courts match the elementsof a state law to a federal analog under the Assimilative CrimesAct differs fundamentally from our INA inquiry. The basic questionunder the Assimilative Crimes Act is whether “federal statutesreveal an intent to occupy so much of the field as would excludethe use of the particular state statute at issue.” Id., at164. Under the Assimilative Crimes Act, the state statute is notcompared to a single federal statute, but rather to a complex offederal statutes that roughly cover the same general conduct and“policies.” Ibid. That statute thus has little to teach usabout 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43): In interpreting theAssimilative Crimes Act, every Member of the Court rejected thesimple elements-matching approach that the Court generally employsto construe the aggravated felony provisions of the INA. See 523U.S., at 182 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (allowing “slightdifferences” in definition between federal and state statute andusing “same-elements inquiry” only as a “starting point”).The majority’s analogy to the federal threestrikes statute, 18 U.S.C. §3559(c)(2)(F), ante,at 17–18, is similarly unhelpful. That provision counts as apredicate “‘serious violent felony’” any“‘Federal or State offense ... wherevercommitted, consisting of’” various crimes, includingseveral “‘as described in’” federal statutes.Ante, at 17. (emphasis added). Though this Court has notconstrued the statute, the majority notes that courts of appealsdisregard the jurisdictional element of federal statutes inassessing whether a state conviction is for a “serious violentfelony.” Ante, at 15–16. But nearly all of the statuteslisted in §3559(c)(2)(F) contain place-based jurisdictionelements—the crime must take place “within the special maritime andterritorial jurisdiction of the United States,” e.g.,§1111(b), or within “the special aircraft jurisdiction of theUnited States,” 49 U.S.C. §46502, and so on. In the twocases cited by the majority, for instance, ante, at 17,Courts of Appeals concluded that a state robbery offense qualifiedas an offense “described in” the federal bank robbery statute eventhough the robbery did not take place in a bank. See UnitedStates v. Wicks, 132 F.3d 383, 387 (CA7 1997);United States v. Rosario-Delgado, 198 F.3d1354, 1357 (CA11 1999). In that statute, it is the “wherevercommitted,” not some loose construction of “described in,” thatspecifically instructs the courts that the location where a crimeoccurs does not matter.Moreover, in other statutes where Congress wantsto exclude jurisdictional elements when comparing state and federaloffenses, it ordinarily just says so. See, e.g., 18U.S.C. §3142(e)(2)(A) (requiring detention of defendantpending trial if “the person has been convicted ... ofa State or local offense that would have been an offense describedin subsection (f)(1) of this section if a circumstance givingrise to Federal jurisdiction had existed”); §2265A(b)(1)(B);§2426(b)(1)(B); §3142(f)(1)(D); §5032; 42 U.S.C.§§671(a)(15)(D)(ii)(I)–(II); §§5106a(b)(2)(B)(xvi)(I)–(II). Absentcomparably clear language, the Court should not presume that theINA intended deportability to depend on a not-so-“settledpractice,” ante, at 15, of occasionally distinguishingbetween substantive and jurisdictional elements.CFinally, the majority suggests that it wouldbe “peculiarly perverse,” ante, at 10, to adopt Luna’splain-text readingof the statute because it would draw adistinction among crimes based on a jurisdictional element that themajority assumes is wholly divorced from “the evil Congress seeksto prevent,” ante, at 15. The jurisdictional element of afederal statute, the majority asserts, is as trivial as theperfunctory warning on a new electronic device: “[A] person wouldsay that she had followed the instructions for setting up an iPhonethat are ‘described in’ the user’s manual, even if she in factignored the one” instructing that she “begin by ‘read[ing]important safety information.’” Ante, at 7, n.5;see also ibid. (comparing jurisdictional element to a“detour” in a 3-week itinerary).For instance, the majority assumes that it wouldnot be “plausible,” ante, at 12, for Congress to havethought that interstate crimes are worse than wholly intrastatecrimes. Perhaps. But when faced with an offense that, like arson,admits of a range of conduct, from the minor to the serious,Congress could plausibly have concluded that arsonsprosecuted as federal crimes are more uniformly serious than arsonsprosecuted as state crimes and counted only the former asaggravated felonies. See, e.g., Klein et al., Why FederalProsecutors Charge: A Comparison of Fed-eral and New York StateArson and Robbery Filings, 2006–2010, 51 Houston L. Rev. 1381,1406, 1416–1419 (2014) (finding that arsons prosecuted federallyinvolve more property damage and more injury than arsons prosecutedunder state law).That is because, far from being token,“conventional jurisdictional elements” serve to narrow the kinds ofcrimes that can be prosecuted, not just to specify the sovereignthat can do the prosecuting. Take the federal statute at issue inthis case. Section 844(i) requires that the property destroyed be“used in interstate ... commerce.” The Court has heldthat “standard, jurisdictional” element, ante, at 21,demands the property’s “active employment for commercial purposes,and not merely a passive, passing, or past connection to commerce.”Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 855(2000) . As a result, the Court held that a defendant who threw aMolotov cocktail through the window of an owner-occupiedresidential house could not be guilty under §844(i) because thehouse was not “active[ly] used” in interstate commerce. Id.,at 851. Surely, however, a New York prosecutor could have secured aconviction under N. Y. Penal Law Ann. §150.10 had the same crimebeen prosecuted in state, rather than federal, court.The difference between an offense under N. Y.Penal Law Ann. §150.10 and an offense under 18 U.S.C.§844(i) is thus more than a technical consideration about whichauthority chooses to prosecute. It is a difference that goes to themagnitude and nature of the “evil,” ante, at 15,itself.*  *  *On the majority’s reading, long-time legalpermanent residents with convictions for minor state offenses areforeclosed from even appealing to the mercy of the AttorneyGeneral. Against our standard method for comparing statutes and thetext and structure of the INA, the majority stacks a supposedsuperfluity, a not-so-well-settled practice, and its convictionthat jurisdictional elements are mere technicalities. But anelement is an element, andI would not so lightly strip a federalstatute of one. I respectfully dissent.